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1. The euro crisis and the economic governance of the Lisbon Treaty 
The euro crisis has placed a spotlight on the institutional system of the Lisbon Treaty for the 
management of fiscal and monetary policy. It would be unfair to say that the European 
Union has not reacted to the challenges posed by financial markets. The EU has approved 
two new treaties (the European Stability Mechanism and the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’), in 
addition to an exceptional number of legislative and regulatory measures. Each of them is, 
by itself, of great innovative significance, although incapable, individually, of securing the 
common currency. In the end, the decisions taken have turned out to arrive too late and to be 
too limited (relative to the quick pace and high stakes of the challenges posed by the 
financial markets).  
Already with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and later with the Lisbon Treaty (2009), it was 
officially established that the economic and financial policy of the EU would be defined and 
regulated within a decision-making regime that was intergovernmental in nature The defeat 
of the Constitutional Treaty in the popular referendums held in France and in the 
Netherlands in 2005, strengthened the intergovernmental approach to the EU. As the former 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy said in his speech in Toulon on 1 December 2011: “the 
reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality. (…) The crisis has pushed the 
heads of state and government to assume greater responsibility because ultimately they have 
the democratic legitimacy to take decisions. (…) The integration of Europe will go the 
intergovernmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.” One year 
earlier, on 2 November 2010, on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the 61th academic 
year of the College of Europe in Bruges, German Chancellor Angela Merkel clearly delivered 
her view that “the Lisbon Treaty has placed the institutional structure (of the EU) on a new 
foundation”, to the point of making traditional distinctions between the “Community and 
the intergovernmental methods outdated”. Indeed, she added, the EU is already functioning 
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according to a “new Union method”, which consists of “coordinated action in a spirit of 
solidarity”. Thus, with the Merkozy leadership, it came to be believed that integration could 
develop only if controlled or governed by the national governments represented in the 
European Council by their leaders (coordinated by the now permanent president of that 
institution) and in the Council by their functional ministers. Furthermore, once the Union has 
started to take care of policies traditionally at the core of member states’ sovereignty (e.g. 
foreign, security, financial and fiscal policy, or electorally sensitive policies, such as 
employment or welfare), it seemed inevitable to promote, in those policies, an integrative 
model based on voluntary coordination by member states’ governments, a model necessarily 
free from supranational constraints. Indeed, this model was already institutionalised in the 
Maastricht Treaty, thus transferred in the Constitutional Treaty and then finally brought into 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Lisbon Treaty has in fact institutionalised a double constitutional regime. In the 
management of public policies linked to the internal market (which are the majority of 
policies undertaken by the EU), the Lisbon Treaty prescribes a model of supranational 
constitution with characteristics that are similar to those of other democratic unions of states. 
Such a constitution sustains and justifies a system of government characterised by a 
separation of powers among the four institutions that participate in the decision-making 
process (a dual executive constituted by the European Council and the European 
Commission and a bicameral legislative branch constituted by the European Parliament and 
the Council). The European Council and the European Parliament have emerged as the 
strongest institutions of this constitutional setting. At the same time, for policies that have 
traditionally been sensitive to national sovereignty, the Lisbon Treaty prescribes a model of 
intergovernmental constitution with characteristics that are very similar to the model 
adopted by associations of states. Such a constitution sustains and justifies a system of 
governance, rather than a system of government, characterised by the control of decisions by 
and within the two institutions (the European Council and the Council) that represent the 
governments of the Union.  
2. The outcome of the intergovernmental constitution 
The euro crisis – which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty 
entered in force (1 December 2009) – has presented the first test of the crisis management 
capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. The result has been unsatisfactory. As 
provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making 
centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission 
playing a technical role. But this institutional set-up has not been able to overcome the three 
fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma 
of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy.  
If integration is based on the voluntary coordination among national policies and unanimity 
in decision-making, it should not come as a surprise that this has enormously slowed down 
the response to the euro crisis. At the same time, the crisis could develop in the first place 
because the intergovernmental constitution did not prevent Greece from cheating on its 
commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact. Greece, in turn, was only following the 
bad example set by Germany and France, which similarly eschewed their obligations in 2003, 
without paying any cost for their non-compliance. It is hardly surprising that a small state 
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would not respect commitments that bigger states have openly refused to respect. And, 
finally, the intergovernmental decision-making process, under conditions of existential crisis 
in the eurozone, has led to the emergence of a hierarchy within the European Council, with 
the creation of a German-French directorate in the financial policy of the Union, raising 
serious issues of legitimacy and accountability. Why should one be surprised that no one less 
than the outgoing president of the Euro Group would denounce such improper directoire?  
The two new Treaties are the outcome of the difficulties encountered by the 
intergovernmental constitution in the management of financial policy. The objectives that 
were set out under those Treaties could have been attained activating a mechanism (like 
strengthened cooperation) already established in the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, the legislative 
decisions of the so-called ‘Six Pack’, approved in November 2011, had already defined the 
policy measures required for strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the 
eurozone leaders have decided to make use of two international treaties out of the Union 
framework not only to neutralise the veto of the UK government but also to overcome the 
dilemmas of the intergovernmental approach. For example, unanimity is no longer necessary 
for the Fiscal Compact to enter into force (thus reducing the veto power of each contracting 
party). Similarly, the powers of third institutions (like the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice) have been strengthened. Their intervention vis-à-vis the contracting party 
that disrespects the agreement is now quasi-automatic, although this automaticity might be 
neutralised by a reverse majority of the financial ministers of the ECOFIN. Furthermore the 
Treaty requires the contracting parties to introduce at the constitutional level (or equivalent) 
the balanced-budget rule, thus also limiting from within the domestic system the possibilities 
for non-compliance.  
These are important innovations for dealing with the veto and non-compliance dilemmas. 
However, they also raise new political problems, especially if the new treaties will not be 
approved by all of the signatory states. Moreover, if recourse to the ECJ is justifiable by the 
Lisbon Treaty itself, the same cannot be said for the power given to the Commission to 
intervene automatically with respect to the non-complaint contracting party. Indeed, in the 
Commission there are some European Commissioners who were nominated by member 
states that have not adhered to those treaties. It is true that the commissioners should not 
have any formal relationship of accountability with their own member state. But it is also 
true that a Commission made up of one commissioner per member state has ended up 
reflecting not only European but also national preferences or sensibilities. While it is 
questionable that those innovations will generate effective decisions, it is certain that they 
will not make decisions more legitimate. In fact, the two treaties exclude from the policy-
making process the European Parliament, the institution that represents the voters who will 
be directly affected by the intergovernmental decisions.  
Moreover, the intergovernmental method celebrated by the two treaties will expose the 
decisions taken to the pressure of the largest and strongest contracting parties (as has 
happened during the euro crisis). With the result that the citizens of the other contracting 
parties will come to be de facto governed by leaders they had never the chance to elect. Again, 
why should one be surprised by the fact that Greek citizens protest against the German 
Chancellor’s policies rather than those of the EU authorities – thus deepening the divide 
between Europeans? Indeed, the intergovernmental approach is meeting a growing 
opposition in many EU member states. It remains to be seen whether the election of François 
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Hollande as President of France in May 2012 signals the beginning of a new political cycle 
characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU. Should that happen, this 
paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas. 
3. The institutional challenge: Effectiveness and legitimacy 
The management of the euro crisis, and the new treaties that have emerged from it, show 
that an intergovernmental EU cannot satisfy the basic requirements of effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Even if it is perhaps a shared view that it is possible to meet those requirements 
only by extending the supranational logic to intergovernmental domains, there are still 
different strategies that might be pursued to move into a supranational framework. One 
traditional strategy has argued that it is necessary to ‘parliamentarise’ the EU. The 
Commission should be brought back to the centre of the EU system (from which it has been 
excluded during the euro crisis) and, along with it, the role of the European Parliament 
should be strengthened as the one institution that confers political legitimacy (through its 
power to approve or dismiss the Commission) to the Union’s executive. The main political 
parties should propose, on the occasion of the next elections of the European Parliament in 
2014, their respective candidate for President of the Commission, transforming those 
elections into the arena for politicising the policies of the EU. At that point, the task of the 
European Council and its President would simply be to formalise a decision made by voters 
and institutionalised by their parliamentary representatives. The EU would have its 
government (the Commission), capable of acting effectively. At the same time, being the 
expression of parliamentary elections, the Commission and its President would have the 
legitimacy to act on behalf of the majority of European voters.  
Although this strategy is clear and familiar, is it also plausible? My answer is negative, 
empirically and normatively. Empirically, at least since the Maastricht Treaty, the Union has 
gone in a direction incongruent with the parliamentary model. The European Parliament has 
strengthened itself as institution, but such reinforcement has not implied a 
parliamentarisation of the Union. The more the European Parliament has increased its 
powers, the stronger has become the European Council. Although the Lisbon Treaty gives 
the European Parliament the right to elect the Commission’s president, in reality it is the 
European Council that selects the candidate for the office, leaving the European Parliament 
little choice but to approve him/her. This predicament makes groundless the claim that the 
European Parliament should play a central role in deciding the European executive.  
Normatively, the Union cannot become of a federal parliamentary system because it is based 
on states (and their citizens) that are asymmetrically correlated. The normative puzzle the 
EU has to resolve (in order to survive and consolidate itself) is as follows: How to keep 
together in a single political system member states with millions of inhabitants and member 
states with a few hundred thousands of inhabitants. Turning the EU into a parliamentary 
system means transforming the European Parliament into the institution with the exclusive 
prerogative ‘to form a government’. But if that is so, then the voters of the larger member 
states will have a much greater weight in determining the outcome than the voters of the 
smaller member states. Unless, of course, the elections are run on a transnational basis which 
would require (first) that the main divisions within all member states are between the same 
parties and (second) that those divisions are politically homogeneous. But this is not the case, 
nor could it be. In a Union of states, in addition to partisan cleavages, the divisions between 
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member states and regional areas are the most significant. Furthermore, the different 
historical national experiences make it improbable that right and left mean the same thing in 
all the member states, especially when dealing with the constitutive issues of the process of 
integration. 
4. The Union as a separation of powers 
But if this is so, is there an alternative paradigm for making the supranational EU more 
effective and legitimate? My answer is positive. The supranational EU has become de facto a 
system of separation of powers because the latter is much more congruent with the need to 
accommodate the asymmetries and differences between its member states. The asymmetries 
in capabilities and population combined with the differences in culture and language have 
encouraged the institutionalisation of a decision-making system that diffuses the exercise of 
decision-making power amongst institutions rather than concentrating it in only one 
institution (the European Parliament). Certainly, institutional ambiguities have been 
preserved, rendering in some respects the separation between executive and legislative 
institutions opaque. It is sufficient to recall that the General Secretary of the Council (a 
legislative institution) functions as a supportive structure of the European Council (an 
executive institution). Or that the High Representative for foreign and security affairs (who, 
as Vice-President of the Commission, is an executive officer) presides over the Council of 
Foreign Affairs (which is a configuration of the legislative Council, although it has a 
permanent chair while the other Council’s configurations are chaired by the various 
ministers of the member states holding the six-month rotating presidency of the Union). 
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, the supranational EU has institutionalised a bicameral 
legislature, constituted by the Council and the European Parliament. 
At the same time, the Union has established a dual executive in the European Council and 
the Commission, with the two respective presidents representing a two-faced Janus. The 
institutionalisation, with the Lisbon Treaty, of the European Council has been a key 
condition to advance the integration process in sensitive policies. With the election of the 
permanent president of the European Council, the latter has irreversibly been transformed 
into a decision-making institution. With the de facto recognition of the Charter of Rights as 
the third Treaty constituting (with the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) the Lisbon Treaty, the judicial review powers of the ECJ 
have seen strengthened. The euro crisis has thus accelerated the transformation of the 
European Council into an executive institution. However, the euro crisis has also shown that 
the president of the European Council might be unfairly exposed to excessive pressure by 
the heads of state and governments of the larger member states. How can one neutralise that 
pressure?  
If one recognises that the European Council has come to embody the political head of the 
Union, then, rather than trying to hide or hinder such evolution, it might be more rational to 
reform the process of selection of its president so as to make its role more effective and 
legitimate. The effectiveness of the European Council’s president would have been stronger 
(compared to that demonstrated during the euro crisis), if he had benefited from greater 
decision autonomy with respect to the heads of state and government (especially of 
Germany and France) who make up the European Council. At the same time, the 
Commission and its president could have exercised a greater influence if their institutional 
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role had been constitutionally linked to the other head of the executive, the European 
Council’s president. Thus, in order to avoid new directoires in the future, it would be 
necessary, firstly, to enlarge the election base of the president of the European Council and, 
secondly, to turn the European Commission into the true support structure of the European 
Council (instead of the Secretary General of the Council). This might raise fears, on the part 
of the Commission, that it would be dominated by the heads of state and government of the 
European Council. But the reverse might also be true, with the Commission able to influence 
the work of the European Council much more, also because of its more structured 
organisation. Indeed, in a dual executive, the logic of competition and the logic of 
cooperation may find an equilibrium point. 
5. Towards the president of the Union 
If one wants to increase the decision-making autonomy of the president of the European 
Council from the members of the latter, then it is necessary to give him/her a legitimacy base 
distinct from them. Of course, in a union of asymmetrical states, it would be unacceptable to 
promote the direct election of the president by the European voters, for the same reason that 
it would be unacceptable to give the European Parliament the power ‘to form the 
government’. Any direct election would favour the larger member states to the detriment of 
the smaller ones. For this reason, the strategy to pursue could be to constitute an electoral 
college through which to reduce the effects of member states’ asymmetries.  
Here is my proposal. The heads of state or government of the European Council would select 
two candidates for the position of the institution’s president, on the basis of both national 
and partisan evaluations. The two candidates would then be subject to the vote of 
presidential electors organised into national electoral colleges. Such colleges could be 
constituted of representatives of national parliaments, whose composition would reflect the 
majorities and minorities of national legislatures. The number of presidential electors for 
each individual member state would be based on population weights, with a correction 
favouring small and medium vis-à-vis larger member states. The two candidates will carry out 
their electoral campaigns presenting their programmes to the national parliaments of the 
member states, and inevitably to the latter’s publics. The candidate elected president of the 
European Council will be the one receiving a majority (inevitably absolute in this case) of the 
votes of the presidential electors in the various national electoral colleges. In this way, the 
European Council maintains its selection power, but loses its election power. The election 
power is assigned to national parliaments, thus making the president of the European 
Council relatively independent from the heads of state and government who constitute that 
institution. The European Parliament should not play any role in the process because of the 
need to preserve the institutional separation of powers between executive and legislative 
institutions at the EU level. The European Council would continue to meet periodically, as 
prescribed under the Lisbon Treaty, with the purpose of discussing the policy strategies 
defined by the president. It would also be necessary that the European Council would be re-
named European Presidency, thus avoiding misunderstanding with the Council (legislative 
body) and at the same time underlying its institutional function (executive body).  
The operational link between the president of the European Council and the European 
Commission and its president should be strengthened, transforming the latter into the true 
operational branch of the former. The European Council’s president and the Commission 
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should meet on a regular (weekly) basis. It would be the Commission’s duty, rather than the 
General Secretary of the Council’s, to prepare the periodical meetings of the European 
Council and to structure its deliberations. The General Secretary of the Council would 
support the activities of the member state holding the rotating presidency and more in 
general the legislative activity of the Council. The procedure for the nomination and 
formation of the Commission’s president and commissioners should remain the same, with 
the European Council’s president proposing (with the consent of the majority of the latter’s 
members) the candidates for those roles and the European Parliament to give its ‘advice and 
consent’. Moreover, the Council might also be included in this process (i.e. regarding the 
approval of commissioners proposed for foreign and security policy or financial policy), once 
the need to make it a properly legislative institution, thus separated from the European 
Council, is duly recognised.  
The role of the Commission should remain what it is: a powerful civil service organisation 
operating in the European interest. The Commission should formally maintain the monopoly 
of legislative initiative in all policy matters (and not only in the policies connected to the 
single market and now decided according to the so-called Community method), although 
politically it will have to share this function with the European Council’s president. The 
model of separation of powers would lead to a redefinition, but not the abrogation, of the 
Community method. In the dual executive, there would be a combination of two 
legitimacies: i) the legitimacy stemming from national parliaments for the president of the 
European Council, and ii) the legitimacy stemming from the European Parliament for the 
president of the Commission. One might assume that the broader legitimacy of the president 
of the European Council will make him/her the political head of the executive, with the 
president of the European Commission leading its technical arm.  
The European Parliament should become what it is already, namely a legislative institution 
whose main role is to check and balance the dual executive, but not to ’form the 
government’. It should be the constitutional duty of the European Parliament and the 
Council, under its specific configurations, to oversee the dual executive. Thanks to the 
separation between legislative and executive institutions, the activity of the bicameral 
legislature will not be constrained by the need to guarantee its political support to the 
‘government’. Indeed, legislatures are much more powerful in systems of separation rather 
than fusion of powers. An executive organizationally structured by the Commission and 
politically directed by the president of the European Council would be more effective and 
legitimate. However, this strengthening of the executive power would require an adequate 
supervision and balancing action from the legislative power. In this regard, it might be 
helpful to go back to a proposal that emerged from the Brussels Constitutional Convention of 
2002-03, that is to differentiate the policies on which each legislative institution will have a 
pre-eminent role in oversight, leaving to the Council the control of those policies that are 
particularly sensitive to the member states (e.g. foreign, security and financial policies) and 
the rest to the European Parliament.  
6. The constitutional challenge: How many treaties? 
With the multiplication of treaties, it would be also necessary to open a debate to discuss 
whether the Union should preserve a unitary character or whether it should institutionally 
differentiate itself. There are two strategies to follow. The first strategy would be that of 
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accelerating the transposition of the new treaties (especially the Fiscal Compact) into the EU 
legal system. Once the main objective has been reached (that of making the signatory states 
introduce, through constitutional or equivalent means, the golden rule of balanced budgets), 
the Fiscal Compact should become part of the Lisbon Treaty, assuming the characteristics of 
a constitutionalised enhanced cooperation not unlike that attained with the Schengen Treaty. 
The integration process would be regulated by a single legal framework, with functional 
internal differentiations relative to specific policies. This strategy has the merit of keeping the 
Union together, but also has the fault of keeping the integration process at the minimum 
common denominator. This might increase the dissatisfaction towards the Union from those 
who would seek more integration, without conquering the consensus of those asking for less. 
Furthermore, if not reformed, an intergovernmental Fiscal Compact, included into the 
Lisbon Treaty, would end up strengthening the latter’s intergovernmental component 
constitution, thus preserving the situation that made crisis management wholly 
unsatisfactory.  
The second strategy would be to build on the institutional differentiation introduced by the 
new treaties, notably the Fiscal Compact. The reform proposals that I have outlined might be 
applied to the latter treaty, supranationalising it through the separation-of-powers 
architecture described earlier: namely by changing the election procedure for the president of 
the Euro Summit; by deepening the cooperation between the latter and the Commission; by 
redefining the Euro Group as a legislative institution; by strengthening the balancing powers 
of the European Parliament over the dual executive. In this manner, two different European 
polities would be constituted, both with supranational character but with different aims: the 
economic Europe and the political Europe. With the latter clearly structured according to the 
logic of separation of powers in order to better guarantee effectiveness and legitimacy to its 
decisions. 
